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Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is estimated to affect 
around 1% of the population (Baird et al., 2006), and is 
characterised by impairments in social communication and 
interaction as well as behavioural and cognitive inflexibility 
(American Psychiatric Association (APA), 2013). A deficit 
in ‘theory of mind’ has been proposed to account for the 
social deficits in ASD, which was originally defined as dif-
ficulty in attributing mental states to oneself and others 
(Premack and Woodruff, 1978). The distinction between 
self-referential metacognition (termed ‘metacognition’) and 
other-referential metacognition (termed ‘mindreading’) is 
pertinent as a wealth of research has explored deficits in 
people with ASD attributing mental states to others that are 
different to their own (see Baron-Cohen, 1997; Baron-
Cohen et al., 1985; Castelli et al., 2002; Frith, 2001); how-
ever, there is a relative paucity of research exploring an 
awareness of one’s own metacognitive states in ASD (see, 
for review, Carruthers, 2009; Williams, 2010).
Those with ASD have impairments in both self- and 
other-referential cognition (Lombardo and Baron-Cohen, 
2011; Lombardo et al., 2007; see also Pfeifer et al., 2013) 
which may indicate the possibility that the same cognitive 
and neural functions underpin both self- and other-referen-
tial metacognition (see Frith and Happé, 1999; Happé, 
2003; Hobson, 1990; Williams, 2010). Williams et al. 
(2009) and Williams and Happé (2009) argue that self- 
referential metacognition may be more impaired than other-
referential metacognition in ASD (see also Lombardo et al., 
2010). The available research suggests that individuals 
with ASD do have a deficit in self-referential metacogni-
tion (hereafter ‘metacognition’). Metacognition encom-
passes two components: first, metacognitive knowledge of 
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cognition (‘declarative’), which is stored acquired knowl-
edge of cognition, such as ‘I am better at arithmetic than I 
am at spelling’. Second, metacognitive experience of cog-
nition (‘procedural’), which encompasses the awareness of 
one’s own cognition (metacognitive monitoring) and the 
capacity to control appropriate cognitive responses to the 
monitoring (metacognitive regulation: Flavell, 1979; Lockl 
and Schneider, 2002; Nelson and Narens, 1990; Schraw 
and Moshman, 1995). Metacognitive monitoring, in par-
ticular, is considered essential for a sense of ‘self-concept’ 
(Roebers et al., 2012) and for day-to-day behavioural func-
tioning, because accurate monitoring of one’s internal 
states facilitates the regulation of and control over those 
states and over learning and behaviour (Nelson and 
Leonesio, 1988). As an example, an accurate ‘feeling of 
knowing’ for what one knows (and does not know) would 
be an indicator of metacognitive monitoring as would a 
reliable ‘judgement of confidence’ in what one knows. 
Wojcik et al. (2013) explored a ‘feeling of knowing’ for 
both episodic and semantic memory and report metacogni-
tive impairments for episodic memory only. Grainger et al. 
(2014) also report diminished feeling of knowing for accu-
rate memory recall in those with ASD (see also Farrant 
et al., 1999a, 1999b). Sawyer et al. (2014) argued that 
social difficulties in ASD are not due to the ability to accu-
rately make emotion recognition decisions but instead are 
due to those with ASD being less able to assess whether 
they have correctly recognised the emotion or not (see also 
Wilkinson et al., 2010).
One area in which metacognition is argued to be a pow-
erful predictor of performance is school-based learning. 
For example, research has highlighted that metacognition 
predicts mathematical performance more powerfully than 
intellectual abilities and there is extensive evidence that 
developing metacognition is an effective intervention in 
school children within and below the ‘normal’ range of 
mathematical ability (Higgins et al., 2013; Iuculano et al., 
2014; Maxwell and Grenier, 2014; Schneider and Artelt, 
2010; Van der Stel et al., 2010; see also Roebers et al., 
2012, 2014). On average, mathematics ability is substan-
tially lower among people with ASD than would be 
expected on the basis of intelligence quotient (IQ) (Chiang 
and Liu, 2007; Mayes and Calhoun, 2003, 2006; see also 
Jones et al., 2009), with educational underachievement in 
mathematics contributing directly to less-than-optimal 
economic outcomes (e.g. low levels of employment) and 
life chances among people with ASD (Estes et al., 2011). A 
better understanding of metacognition in ASD with refer-
ence to the learning of mathematics may therefore have 
potentially far-reaching benefits.
One methodology for assessing metacognition, specifi-
cally metacognitive monitoring, that is applicable to math-
ematics learning was proposed by Russell and Hill (2001). 
After a child’s drawing was manipulated by an experi-
menter so that it differed from what the child had actually 
had drawn (without the knowledge of the child), children 
were asked ‘what did you mean to draw?’ and ‘what did 
you think you were drawing?’ (after Russell and Hill, 
2001). Russell and Hill found that when the ‘Mean’ ques-
tion was asked before the ‘Think’ question, only around 
half of the children with ASD correctly recognised that they 
had not intended the actual outcome, although other experi-
ments did not reveal a consistent pattern of metacognitive 
monitoring deficits. This methodology was developed by 
Williams and Happé (2010) who found around one-third of 
participants with ASD (mistakenly) reported that they had 
meant to draw the experimenter-manipulated picture and 
that they thought they were drawing the experimenter-
manipulated picture (erroneously as this was not possible: 
A second study found a similar proportion of children with 
ASD erroneously reported that they had intended a knee 
reflex). The authors provide evidence that the ‘Mean’ and 
‘Think’ questions are comparably difficult for those with 
ASD. Overall, the authors suggest that those with ASD 
have limited awareness of their own metacognition, and 
this deficit was independent of both age and verbal ability 
(see also Phillips et al., 1998; Russell and Jarrold, 1998).
Thinking that you meant to make an error which relates 
directly to a failure of metacognitive monitoring. An inter-
nally generated monitoring system is argued to compare a 
representation of the correct or intended response with a 
representation of the actual response – with discrepancies 
leading to remedial actions (metacognitive regulation: see 
Henderson et al., 2006). A deficit in online assessments of 
‘have I got this correct?’ and ‘did I mean to get this cor-
rect?’ could have a significant impact upon the capacity to 
learn from errors. An event-related potential (ERP) study 
of decision-making errors found that there were no differ-
ences between those with and without ASD when the cor-
rect decision was made. However, there was reduced 
activity in those with ASD when an error was made, sug-
gesting a specific insensitivity to error awareness 
(Vlamings et al., 2008; see also Henderson et al., 2006). 
The authors also noted a lack of post-error slowing in ASD 
(compared to controls) and suggest this impairment in 
error awareness (metacognitive monitoring) may lead to a 
failure to reflect and evaluate the error and change strategy 
to deal with the situation (metacognitive regulation). 
Error-correction in learning in ASD has received little 
scrutiny, although it has been suggested that people with 
ASD ‘learn how to learn’ differently (Powell and Jordan, 
1993). The types of errors made may therefore differ 
between those with and without ASD.
This study asked, if those with ASD ‘learn how to learn’ 
differently, do these metacognitive differences impact 
upon learning, and how does this affect the learning of 
mathematics in particular? This study examined the role of 
metacognitive monitoring in learning in ASD – specifi-
cally in mathematics. In addition to mathematics poten-
tially being particularly problematic for those with ASD, 
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the advantage of researching mathematics learning is that 
multiple questions can be asked, rather than a single 
instance. Based upon previous research (Williams and 
Happé, 2010), we predicted that learners with ASD would 
be more likely to report that an erroneous answer was cor-
rect and more likely to report that they meant to make an 
error in their mathematics learning (after an error had been 
made). We also explored the errors made in mathematics 
learning to identify any differences between learners with 
and without ASD.
Methods
Participants
The project was approved by the Departmental Research 
Ethics Committee which ensures adherence to the ethical 
principles of the British Psychological Society. Participants 
comprised 23 males and 5 females with a diagnosis of 
ASD attending an educational unit specifically for young 
people with ASD, attached to a mainstream school. 
Participants had been diagnosed by international standards 
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(4th ed.; DSM-IV) by clinicians as an entry requirement 
for the unit. An index of IQ (Wechsler Abbreviated Scale 
of Intelligence (WASI)-UK, Wechsler, 1999) was also 
taken. Verbal IQ ranged from 63 to 108 (mean = 89.69, 
standard deviation (SD) = 10.59) and performance IQ 
ranged from 60 to 126 (mean = 96.42, SD = 16.46). Two 
participants were excluded on the basis of IQ being less 
than 70, resulting in the data from 21 males and 5 females 
being analysed. Of the retained sample, the verbal IQ 
ranged from 71 to 108 (mean = 91.08, SD = 9.31) and per-
formance IQ ranged from 80 to 126 (mean = 99.25, 
SD = 13.62). The mean age was 13.7 years (SD = 1.3 years).
The United Kingdom has a National Curriculum for 
mathematics that prescribes what should be taught at what 
age. Students at this age would typically be expected to be 
at ‘Key Stage 3’. Despite participants with ASD having a 
mean IQ within the normal range, teaching staff reported 
that these participants were working at a Key Stage 2 level 
for mathematics. Key Stage 2 typically relates to 7–11 years 
of age. As a consequence, we employed a typically devel-
oping (TD) control group who were also working at Key 
Stage 2. The metacognitive monitoring processes of 
‘Thinking’ and ‘Meaning’ to get an answer correct 
described above would typically expect to be developed by 
the age of 5½ years (see Wilkinson et al., 2010) and predict 
ability around 11 years of age (Roebers et al., 2014). We 
therefore recruited 16 males and 40 females (the number in 
the school year) from a mainstream school in a similar 
location to the ASD unit. The TD participants were in the 
final year of Key Stage 2 (‘Year 6’), aged 10.5 years 
(SD = 0.5). The TD group were therefore younger than the 
ASD group but being taught the same level of National 
Curriculum mathematics material. There were no reported 
disorders in the TD group and no teacher reports of abnor-
mal intellect (such as special educational needs, which was 
reflected in the end of year national assessments). Due to 
time constraints, an independent assessment of IQ could 
not be undertaken. Independent assessments of metacogni-
tion and mathematical ability were not undertaken as it has 
been found that the former is highly predictive of the latter 
and matching on this basis may obscure group differences 
(Higgins et al., 2013; Iuculano et al., 2014; Van der Stel 
et al., 2010). We anticipated specific deficits in the ASD 
sample that could not be matched to the cognitive profile 
of another sample (e.g. Chiang and Liu, 2006; Mayes and 
Calhoun, 2003, 2006). An ASD and TD group was there-
fore matched on being exposed to the same level of math-
ematics curriculum material, although this does not 
necessitate both groups would be of the same mathemati-
cal ability. The stepped procedure described below pro-
vided an index of level of mathematical ability.
Procedure
Each participant was seated with the experimenter in a 
one-on-one situation in a quiet room adjacent to the class-
room. Participants had paper and a pencil and could write 
down workings-out, but could not use a calculator. 
Participants were each asked three sets of five mathemati-
cal questions, totalling 15 questions. The questions were 
typed on a sheet of paper and read to participants. The first 
set of five questions were always level 1 questions (based 
on the UK National Curriculum) – multiplication of num-
bers both of which were between 1 and 5 (e.g. 3 × 4 = ?; 
? × 5 = 10). If errors were made, the second set of ques-
tions were level 1 questions (and again if errors were 
made, the third set of questions were at level 1). If no 
errors were made in the first set of questions, the next set 
of questions were level 2 – multiplication of numbers both 
of which were greater than 5 (e.g. 8 × ? = 48; 7 × 9 = ?; 
again from the National Curriculum). If errors were made, 
the third set of questions were again at level 2. If no errors 
were made with level 2 questions, the third set comprised 
five difficult questions, again drawn from examples from 
the National Curriculum, specifically (1) 23.1 × 8 = ? (2) 
364 ÷ 7 = ? (3) 45.3 × 6 = ? 48 ÷ 3 = ? (4) 602 × 57 = ? This 
stepped approach was to present students with stimuli in 
which they were able to achieve correct answers and mak-
ing an error was a realistic possibility. Obtaining no correct 
answers would have been an exclusion criteria but this did 
not occur. Note that the stepped methodology does mean 
that students were exposed to different stimuli.
To specifically address the role of metacognitive mon-
itoring, participants were asked the following question 
after they had given their answer but before they had 
received the feedback as to whether their answer was cor-
rect or not:
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Do you think you got the answer to that question right or 
wrong? (The order of the words ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ was 
varied between participants).
Possible responses were right, wrong or don’t know.
The participants were then told if they had got the 
answer right or wrong. They were then asked:
Did you mean to get that question right/wrong? (depending 
upon if they had been correct).
Possible responses were: yes, no or don’t know.
The wording was taken from Williams and Happé 
(2010). The questions were designed to ascertain first 
whether participants were aware they had made errors 
(question 1 – ‘Think’) and second whether they then 
believed they had intended to get the answer correct or 
make an error (question 2 – ‘Mean’). Importantly, the two 
responses require different words to be produced. In addi-
tion, the errors made were analysed using a framework of 
errors (Ryan and Williams, 2007; see McCloskey et al., 
1985). Two judges rated the errors using the Ryan and 
Williams (2007) framework. Inter-rater reliability was 
high (>80%) and disagreements over how to categorise an 
error were resolved through discussion.
Statistical analysis and exclusion criteria
As noted above, two participants from the ASD group 
were excluded as their IQ was below 70. Two ASD partici-
pants were unavailable for IQ testing. These two partici-
pants with ASD and undetermined IQ were retained as IQ 
was also undetermined in the TD group. There was no 
anecdotal evidence from teachers that any of those without 
IQ data would be considered as having learning difficul-
ties. As there was most likely to be a difference between 
those with and without ASD in the number or errors made, 
it was appropriate to report the proportion of metacogni-
tive errors. The prediction of more metacognitive errors 
allowed for one-tailed t-tests to be conducted for the error 
analysis. Where equalities of variance cannot be assumed, 
there is a decrease in the degrees of freedom.
Results
Overall, the ASD group and the TD group did not signifi-
cantly differ on the number of correct responses made for 
the mathematics questions (11.35 and 12.70, respectively; 
t(31.89) = 1.7, ns). In all, 126 errors were made by the ASD 
group and 115 by the TD group. As each participant was 
asked 15 questions, this equates to around 20% of responses. 
The proportion of ‘think’ and ‘mean’ metacognitive 
responses after making the errors is reported in Table 1.
Table 1 highlights that when an answer is incorrect, 
those with ASD were (erroneously) more likely to think 
they had provided the correct answer. There were no sig-
nificant group differences in the proportions who thought 
they had provided an incorrect response or did not know if 
they had provided an incorrect response. In addition, when 
an answer was revealed to be incorrect, the ASD group 
were significantly more likely to report that they meant to 
get the answer wrong. The TD group were more likely to 
report meaning to get the answer right, and very few par-
ticipants reported not knowing whether they meant to get 
the answer right or wrong.
To explore whether age was an overall factor that 
impacted upon the results, partial correlations were con-
ducted controlling for group (ASD and TD). In addition, 
Pearson correlations were conducted for the ASD group 
between verbal and performance IQ and the variables in 
Table 1. Age, verbal and performance IQ did not signifi-
cantly relate to whether participants thought an incorrect 
response was right, wrong or did not know; whether par-
ticipants meant to get an answer right, wrong or did not 
know; or the total number of correct answers (all p > 0.05) 
– although there was one exception: A higher performance 
IQ significantly related to less ‘don’t know if thought cor-
rect’ responses after an error had been made (r(22) = −0.61, 
p < 0.01). There were few females with ASD. As a conse-
quence, potential sex differences were investigated by 
conducting t-tests between males and females from the TD 
group. No significant sex differences were identified in 
whether participants thought an incorrect response was 
right, wrong or did not know, nor whether participants 
meant to get an answer right, wrong or did not know, nor 
the number of correct answers (all p > 0.05).
A second analysis explored whether the metacognitive 
variables related to the number of errors made in the math-
ematics task. As there were group differences, Pearson 
correlations were run separately for the TD and ASD 
groups. For the TD group, the number of incorrect answers 
correlated positively with thinking a wrong answer was 
wrong (r = 0.44, p < 0.01) and negatively with not know-
ing whether a wrong answer was correct (r = −0.35, 
p < 0.05), but not thinking a wrong answer was correct 
(p > 0.05). Meaning to get an incorrect answer positively 
correlated with the number of incorrect answers (r = 0.52, 
p < 0.001 - note this occurred very rarely in the TD group), 
but not meaning to get a wrong answer correct or not 
knowing if they meant to get the answer correct (both 
p > 0.05). There were no significant correlates with the 
number of incorrect, correct or don’t know responses for 
the ASD group (all p > 0.2).
A third analysis explored the types of errors that had 
been made. The stepped methodology allowed both groups 
to get a comparable number of questions correct and make 
a comparable number of errors and both groups answered 
questions from levels 1, 2 and 3 (see ‘Method’ section). 
However, substantially more of the TD group (78%) 
reached level 3 than the ASD group (41%), indicating a 
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higher level of ability for the TD group. As the same math-
ematical processes were embedded within each level (e.g. 
multiplication), Table 2 highlights the proportions of each 
error made for TD and ASD groups, remembering that the 
TD group attempted more of the harder versions than the 
ASD group.
Table 2 contains an error analysis of 126 errors made by 
the TD group and 115 errors made by the ASD group. By 
far the most common error was consistent across both 
groups and was an error recounting multiplication facts. It 
is important to bear in mind the error differences relate to 
less than one-third of the errors. It is interesting that the 
second and third most common errors made by the ASD 
group were not made at all by the TD group. Both of these 
errors related to the processing of the operators (e.g. the 
multiplication sign in 3 × 3 = ?). Similarly, the second and 
third most common errors made by the TD group were 
hardly made at all by the ASD group. Both of these errors 
relate to the scale of the answer (e.g. units, tens, 
hundreds).
Finally, it has been found that metacognitive differ-
ences emerge in ASD when errors are made but not when 
correct responses are made. A final analysis explored 
metacognitive ‘think’ and ‘mean’ responses to correct 
answers (reflecting Table 1 above, but when the answers 
were correct). There was one significant difference: The 
ASD group were significantly more likely to think that 
they had got a correct answer right than the TD group 
(t(75) = 2.45, p < 0.05; all other comparisons, p > 0.05).
Discussion
Deficits in metacognition have been reported in ASD. 
Children with ASD have reported that they meant to make 
errors, that is, the observed erroneous behaviour was 
intended. Such a deficit in metacognitive monitoring limits 
the likelihood of remedial compensatory strategies being 
employed (metacognitive regulation). This study explored 
whether learners with ASD thought they had made an error 
and meant to make an error in a series of mathematical 
questions. This study found that the ASD group were both 
more likely to think an erroneous answer was correct, and 
when told they had made an error were significantly more 
likely to report that they meant to make that error. Whereas 
these indices of metacognitive monitoring significantly 
correlated with actual performance in the TD group, this 
was not the case for the ASD group. These findings are 
consistent with a metacognitive monitoring deficit in ASD 
(rather than genuinely intending to make errors at the time 
of doing the task).
This is the first study to report this deficit in the context 
of learning. The findings are consistent with previous 
research from other contexts, such as face recognition, 
memory and intention with respect to drawing (Sawyer 
Table 1. Proportion of metacognitive errors made by ASD and typically developing (TD) learners.
Mean proportion incorrect and … ASD TD t-test
thought correct 0.35(0.40) 0.19(0.30) t(60) = 1.81, p < 0.05
thought incorrect 0.31(0.41) 0.35(0.37) t(60) = 0.36, ns
don’t know if correct 0.34(0.38) 0.47(0.42) t(60) = 1.13, ns
meant to get correct 0.62(0.45) 0.86(0.30) t(28.93) = 2.23, p < 0.05
meant to get incorrect 0.27(0.39) 0.03(0.14) t(22.57) = 2.75, p < 0.05
don’t know if meant to 0.11(0.24) 0.11(0.27) t(62) = 0.01, ns
ASD: autism spectrum disorder; ns: non-significant.
Table 2. Types of errors made by typically developing (TD) learners and those with ASD.
Error type ASD TD
Erroneous multiplication facts (e.g. 8 × 8 = 62) 0.65 0.46
Choose inappropriate operation to solve problems (e.g. 2 × 3 = 5) 0.15 0.00
Multiplications of tens are left out or added (e.g. 6 × 5 = 3 or 300) 0.02 0.15
Decimal place value misconception (e.g. 45.3 × 6 = 2718) 0.00 0.06
Ignores one (or more) parts (e.g. 3 × 4 = 3) 0.00 0.04
Neglects operators to conjoin numbers (e.g. 3 × 3 = 33) 0.03 0.00
In working out, error in addition of multiples (e.g. 602 × 57 = (600 × 57 = 34,200) + (2 × 57 = 114) 
total = 34,200 + 114 = 34,114)
0.01 0.05
Makes a carry error in a vertical layout 0.00 0.02
Did not attempt question 0.04 0.05
Unclassified error 0.10 0.15
ASD: autism spectrum disorder.
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et al., 2014; Wilkinson et al., 2010; Williams and Happé, 
2010) and electroencephalogram (EEG) evidence of 
reduced error awareness in ASD (Henderson et al., 2006; 
Vlamings et al., 2008). The deficits in metacognitive mon-
itoring in this study were only in evidence when an error 
was made. Indeed when no errors were made, those with 
ASD correctly identified they had achieved a correct 
response to a greater degree than the TD group. Thus, the 
findings of this study are consistent with the EEG research 
that the metacognitive monitoring deficits in ASD are 
most pronounced when errors are made. It is interesting to 
note one-third of ASD responses indicated that an incor-
rect response was correct, which is the same proportion 
reported by Williams and Happé (2010) within a non-
learning context, which may be consistent with metacogni-
tive monitoring deficits being domain-general and 
applying to all tasks (Gourgey, 1998; Schraw, 1998), 
although this needs to be empirically evaluated. The con-
text of learning is particularly pertinent; however, as defi-
cits in error awareness are argued to have downstream 
effects on responding appropriately to errors to result in 
learning (Henderson et al., 2006; Vlamings et al., 2008). 
This study suggests that highlighting when an error has 
occurred is the first stage in addressing metacognitive 
monitoring deficits in ASD.
Previous research has indexed metacognitive monitor-
ing through a ‘feeling of knowing’ (Grainger et al., 2014; 
Wojcik et al., 2013, 2014) and presumably, therefore, a 
sense of not knowing (see also Sawyer et al., 2014). The 
findings of this study are consistent with this and suggest a 
metacognitive monitoring deficit in ASD that extends at 
least from meta-memory to meta-learning. Metacognitive 
monitoring has been associated with a sense of self-con-
cept (Roebers et al., 2012) and is argued to inform meta-
cognitive regulation (Nelson and Leonesio, 1988), that is, 
the capacity to control appropriate cognitive responses to 
the monitoring. Metacognitive regulation relates to execu-
tive functioning (Roebers et al., 2012) which may be con-
sistent with executive dysfunction accounts of ASD, such 
as perseverating with erroneous responses (see Wilkinson 
et al., 2010). Whether metacognitive monitoring and meta-
cognitive regulation provide a framework within which 
both meta-representation of mental states and executive 
dysfunction accounts of ASD overlap is an open question. 
Hill and Russell (2002) draw a distinction between an 
executive function self-monitoring as a ‘subpersonal’ pro-
cess (knowing oneself to be the source of self-determined 
change) with a ‘personal-level’ self-referential perspec-
tive-taking process (akin to a ‘personal’ metacognitive 
monitoring).
It has been argued that this self-referential metacogni-
tion may relate to other-referential metacognition, both of 
which may share common cognitive and neural mecha-
nisms (see Frith and Happé, 1999; Happé, 2003; see 
Williams, 2010). The results are consistent with a decrease 
in the ASD group to attribute false belief to themselves. 
Thus, ASD may be characterised as a deficit in self- and 
other- referential cognition (see Williams and Happé, 
2010), or metacognition and mindreading (respectively, 
the latter not assessed in this study). It is also possible, 
however, that with a mean age of 13.7 years, such a com-
mon cognitive deficit is no longer present, but that the 
development of the metacognitive skills necessary in an 
academic situation are delayed for people with ASD. As 
mindreading was not assessed in this study, this possibility 
cannot be ruled out. One avenue to explore this hypothesis 
could be to explore if metacognitive monitoring during 
mathematics tasks relates to mindreading tasks (see 
Carruthers, 2009). In addition to this potential theoretical 
implication, Thompson et al. (2011) (see also Alter et al., 
2007; Simmons and Nelson, 2006) have suggested that a 
lack of a metacognitive feeling of knowing serves to over-
ride intuitive processing with deliberative processing 
within Dual Process Theory (see Evans and Stanovich, 
2013 for review). Brosnan et al. (2014), for example, 
report that those with ASD request significantly more 
information than controls to reach the same level of confi-
dence in decision-making. This would be consistent with 
an ASD profile engaging in greater deliberation in response 
to a diminished metacognitive monitoring sense of a feel-
ing of knowing.
Taken together, it seems that there is a deficit in error 
awareness in ASD, indexed by the ‘think’ question in this 
study. This is consistent with Russell and Jarrold (1998) 
who found that children with ASD were less likely to cor-
rect errors they had made, whether there was external feed-
back that the error had occurred or whether internal 
monitoring was required to be aware of the error. The 
‘mean’ question is also of interest as it suggests that once 
an error has been made, there is a tendency in people with 
ASD to report that the error was intended. One possibility 
was that those with ASD genuinely intended to make 
errors, but this seems unlikely as an apparent intention to 
make errors did not relate to actual errors. Other possibili-
ties include a deficit in (1) monitoring the outcome of 
intention, (2) discriminating between intended and unin-
tended outcomes and (3) reporting on the nature of an 
intended outcome when it was unexpected (see Russell 
and Hill, 2001). Russell and Hill did not find evidence for 
these possibilities in ASD, although Phillips et al. (1998) 
report that children with ASD tend to report that an unin-
tended outcome had in fact been intended, which is con-
sistent with this study and Williams and Happé (2010). 
Phillips et al. and Williams and Happé, however, had a 
very different (shooting and drawing, respectively) tasks. 
One possibility is that there is a domain-general tendency 
to infer one’s own intention from one’s own behaviour in 
ASD, that is, inferring intention from knowing oneself to 
be the source of self-determined change (see Hill and 
Russell, 2002). Russell and Jarrold (1998) speculate it is 
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this (subpersonal) executive difficulty in monitoring one’s 
own actions that can lead to a failure in developing a sense 
of being responsible for the outcomes of one’s own actions 
and ultimately an impoverished self-concept (see also 
Roebers et al., 2012). Importantly, however, this study 
suggests that such deficits only occur when errors are 
made, the ASD group did not make more errors when the 
‘think’ and ‘mean’ questions were asked about their cor-
rect responses (indeed they were more accurate). Thus, 
typically people seem to know if they are right or have 
made an error and adjust their behaviour accordingly to 
conform to an intended outcome. Those with ASD can be 
characterised as knowing when they are right, but not 
knowing when they have made an error (so no conflict 
with intention) and have an associated diminished capacity 
to adjust behaviour accordingly.
A provisional error analysis also highlighted potential 
similarities and differences in the types of errors made by 
those with and without a diagnosis of ASD. Both groups 
tended to recount erroneous multiplication facts as their 
most common error. It is potentially interesting for future 
research that those with ASD also had a unique error pro-
file that included problems processing the operator – errors 
that were not made by the TD group. Difficulties in math-
ematics specifically in people with ASD who have a nor-
mal to high IQ have been previously identified (Mayes and 
Calhoun, 2003; see Chiang and Lin, 2007).
Jones et al. (2009) report that 6% of adolescents with 
ASD demonstrated an ‘Arithmetic Dip’, which was deter-
mined by a specific underperformance upon numerical 
operations (16% showed the opposite pattern of an 
‘Arithmetic Peak’ – both of which were largely independ-
ent of ‘Reading Dips and Peaks’). When using words 
rather than operators (e.g. ‘If you have two red balloons 
and three blue balloons, how many balloons do you have 
altogether?’), Titeca et al. (2014) found no deficits in chil-
dren with ASD. Speculatively, therefore, there may be a 
small subgroup within the ASD population who have dif-
ficulties with numeric operations due to processing 
numeric operators. Error analysis may facilitate a better 
understanding of this cognitive profile, which is the cogni-
tive profile evident in most people with ASD (with 
IQ > 70). Language impairment has also been associated 
with difficulties with mathematics. Phonological process-
ing skills specifically impact upon numeric operations (i.e. 
arithmetic computation skills, see Hecht et al., 2001), 
although whether this relates to the processing of the 
numeric operator specifically remains to be determined. 
Pimperton and Nation (2010) found a group of poor com-
prehenders who also scored significantly lower on the 
vocabulary subscale of the WASI compared to a matched 
control group, did not show a deficit in processing numeri-
cal operations (though there was a specific deficit in math-
ematical reasoning). Thus verbal IQ (as assessed by the 
WASI) or reading comprehension would not be expected 
to account for the differences in errors between the groups. 
Within this study, verbal and performance IQ did not sig-
nificantly relate to the ‘think’ or ‘mean’ question for the 
ASD group (except a higher performance IQ related to 
fewer ‘don’t know responses). IQ data were not available 
for the TD group. Verbal comprehension deficits, however, 
may interfere with the ability to understand fully what the 
metacognitive questions entail.
McCloskey et al. (1985) propose a model of mathemat-
ical processing based upon two elements, namely number 
processing (comprehension and production) and calcula-
tion. The calculation system includes a discrete module for 
processing operational symbols specifically. The model is 
based upon neuropsychological evidence of patients who 
have intact number processing but impaired processing of 
visually presented operators (e.g. 3 × 5 = 8). Within 
McCloskey et al.’s model, the present data would suggest 
that it is the calculation rather than the number processing 
system that may reflect differences between the ASD and 
control groups. Future research can explore the extent to 
which this effect may relate to the inaccurate perception or 
processing of operators or a more literal conception of 
combining numbers (e.g. 3 + 3 = 33). Directly exploring 
links with indices of ability beyond verbal and perfor-
mance IQ as well as attention also represent avenues for 
future research as attentional problems have been reported 
in many of those with a diagnosis of ASD (for example, 
see Ames and White, 2011).
There are a range of limitations to this study. First, the 
age varied between the two groups. The metacognitive pro-
cesses under investigation are typically established by age 
of 5½ years, so we can be fairly confident they would be 
established in our TD group, despite their younger age. The 
deficits were identified in the older group and there were no 
correlates with age (when controlling for diagnostic group). 
The younger group were selected as they were receiving 
the same level of mathematics tuition as those with ASD 
(Key Stage 2). Despite this, there was evidence that the TD 
group had a higher level of mathematical ability than those 
with ASD. The ASD group had an IQ within the normal 
range (performance IQ had a mean of 99.25) but impaired 
mathematical ability, which is the typical ASD profile 
(Mayes and Calhoun, 2003; 2006; see Chiang and Lin, 
2007). Chiang and Lin also report there are a small group of 
mathematically gifted people with ASD (see also Iuculano 
et al., 2014; Jones et al., 2009), and the present finding may 
not extend to such a group, or those with an IQ outside of 
the normal range. It would be interesting to identify whether 
metacognition differentiated this mathematically gifted 
subgroup from the typical ASD profile. This could be 
assessed by presenting more complex material upon which 
mathematically gifted learners with and without ASD could 
be compared for their responses to errors. The stepped 
approach to increasing the difficulty of mathematics ques-
tions in this study also meant that different participants 
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answered different questions. This needs to be borne in 
mind, especially with regard to the analysis of errors, 
although both groups were exposed to the full range of 
potential questions. This was structured so that participants 
were presented with questions that would elicit errors, in 
the context of also correctly answering questions. This was 
largely successful as all the participants answered some 
questions correctly and most made errors.
However, a major limitation is the matching of the sam-
ples. There was not an independent assessment of mathe-
matical ability prior to the study undertaken by all 
participants. The unique cognitive profile of ASD makes 
matching to other clinical groups problematic (Mayes and 
Calhoun, 2003, 2006). Matching based upon mathematics 
ability may incorporate a usual low ability ASD profile 
with a gifted subgroup. An ideal control group would be 
those with a normal IQ and a specific deficit in mathemat-
ics ability; however, there are numerous methods for 
assessing mathematical ability and diagnostic criteria for a 
‘mathematical learning disability’ remain unresolved (see 
Geary et al., 2007). Given the pattern of errors made, 
another comparison group of interest would be partici-
pants with specific language impairment and/or poor text 
comprehension skills. An additional option for future 
research could be to use even younger controls. Key Stage 
2 tuition starts at the age of 7 years, although the metacog-
nitive processes under investigation would only have been 
established relatively recently for this group and may not 
consistently predict ability until around 11 years of age 
(see Roebers et al., 2014; Wilkinson et al., 2010). It is of 
potential interest that the ASD group differed from a TD 
group, as the significant differences identified by Williams 
and Happé (2010) were largely between their ASD and 
‘developmentally disabled’ groups, not between their ASD 
and TD groups. However, this major matching limitation 
needs to be borne in mind when interpreting the data, 
although the findings of metacognitive deficits are consist-
ent with the literature from other contexts (Grainger et al., 
2014; Sawyer et al., 2014; Williams and Happé, 2010) 
which may suggest a generalised weakness in metacogni-
tive monitoring (although see Wojcik et al., 2013, 2014).
The groups were not balanced for gender. This is typi-
cal for ASD populations, but the male–female bias was 
unexpected in the control sample. No gender differences 
were identified in this study, but the imbalance of numbers 
means this should be interpreted with caution. There were 
no reported diagnoses or extreme abilities reported for the 
TD group and a normal IQ was assumed as it was not pos-
sible to formally assess within the classroom setting, which 
again is a limitation of the study. Finally, while we were 
able to view the ASD students’ diagnostic records to con-
firm their diagnosis, we were not able to administer any 
formal assessments of ASD. A formal clinical diagnosis 
was required for access to the ASD unit, but it would be 
interesting to explore whether metacognitive differences 
related to variations in severity.
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